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ought to be chosen in partisan elections (as they are in North Carolina), nor is it to say that individual rights should be at the mercy of
plebiscites. It is simply to observe that even Federalists like Alexander Hamilton, smarter and much more elite than anybody else, realized that they had somehow to square liberty with popular rule:
they appealed from the people angry to the people calm. Constitutions are the higher law precisely because they are the majority's
considered opinion.

REFLECI'IONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACI'ION BABY.
By Stephen L. Carter.1 New York: Basic Books. 1991. Pp.
xiii, 286. Cloth, $23.00.
Daniel R. Ortiz 2

Despite its press, this is not really a book about affirmative action. To be sure, it swipes at the various arguments used to justify
affirmative action programs, challenges many orthodoxies and argues for a major overhauling of racial preferences, but its real concern lies elsewhere-in the contemporary politics of AfricanAmerican identity. Racial preferences may have sparked these reflections, but racial identity remains the focus of their true concern.
To understand this, however, discussion must begin with Carter's
ostensible subject: affirmative action.
Carter takes on both the "traditional" and "modern" approaches to racial preferences, by which he means the remedial and
diversity justifications, respectively. Although both approaches actually have a long history in the debate and can, for example, be
found in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,3 it is true
that the diversity rationale, the "modern" approach, has enjoyed
increasing prominence with the advent of critical race studies.4 The
more "traditional" approach captures little of Carter's interest and
he dispatches it quickly.
Against those who believe that racial preferences are permissible and sometimes even necessary to remedy racial oppression,
Carter makes three primary arguments. First, he notes that racial
oppression has not harmed all African-Americans the same way.
I. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale University.
2. Professor of Law and Harrison Foundation Research Professor, University of
Virginia.
3. 438 u.s. 265 (1978).
4. See Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal
Academia, 1990 Duke L.J. 705.
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Some, including himself, have suffered from it but arrived with
nearly all their opportunities intact. Others, he admits, have not.
But for him the point remains that oppression has not injured every
African-American in equally serious ways and that different forms
of oppression have injured members of other classes. Thus, simple
racial preferences seem a very rough remedy.
Second, Carter argues that racial preferences cannot effectively
compensate for any past disadvantage. The belief that they can is
simply a "pretense" we should "abandon." This is true, he argues,
because racial preferences help those African-Americans who need
help least or, put differently, those who most need compensation are
least able to take advantage of the benefits affirmative action programs can bring. In education and the professions, for example,
affirmative action is just a form of "racial justice on the cheap" that
eases white guilt and benefits middle-class African-Americans while
ignoring the misery of the larger number of blacks in the lower
class.
In fact, to the extent people believe preferences help remedy
inequality they may actually deepen it instead. The more we are
lulled into complacency with cheap, cosmetic fixes, the less likely
we are to tackle the primary and more intractable obstacles to black
advancement, like the "social infrastructure of inner-city communities." Unlike affirmative action, programs that address these real
problems do not come cheaply.
Third, Carter argues that the costs of affirmative action to the
black community itself clearly outweigh any benefits such programs
might bring. Racial preferences, in his view, inevitably marginalize
those they aim to help. They limit the range of African-American
ambition and success to that of being not the best, but only the
"best black." Like any double standard, those implied in racial
preferences stigmatize the success of those they help. Under the
guise of redressing injury, they reintrench the stereotype of black
inferiority more deeply-in the eyes of both whites and people of
color.
None of these arguments is new. They represent the standard
objections to remedial justifications for affirmative action. The only
innovation is that Carter, a self-admitted beneficiary of such programs and leading African-American scholar, is now leading the
charge. The importance of this part of the book, in other words,
lies not in what is said, but in who says it. This is true in two
senses. First, Carter's identity as a beneficiary and a scholar of
color may lead people inside and outside the African-American
community to take the arguments against such programs more seri-
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ously. If people within the community itself speak against preferences, we cannot dismiss the arguments as easily as we might have
before. Second, and more important, the hostile reception of
Carter's views within the Mrican-American community leads him
to explore his place in that community and the notion of racial identity itself. This part of the book more seriously engages him and
holds much more interest for the reader.
Racial identity implicates what Carter calls the modern or diversity rationale for affirmative action, which he unequivocally rejects. Unlike the earlier approach, this view makes difference, not
injury, central. It holds that African-Americans, regardless of any
injury they have suffered, should be represented in many arenas because of their distinctive cultural perspective. Although Carter admits that "history does make black people different from white
people" he argues both that this history does not make blacks different in "some predictable ... way" and that blacks' difference should
not be valued any more than anyone else's. Holding all three of
these beliefs together, however, proves difficult.
Carter's rejection of the diversity rationale represents an oblique attack on critical race theory. Unfortunately, he somewhat
misrepresents it. To him, critical race theorists value black difference almost solely because of historical oppression. Only the suffering of African-Americans, he believes, could warrant the privilege
diversity theorists would grant the black perspective. This view discomforts him because it creates a "hierarchy of suffering" that "reject[s] ... the idea that recognizing difference can be a binding
force, a form of love." "[M]ak[ing] the fact of suffering the badge of
authority defeats the purpose of valuing diversity," for it "make[s] a
potentially bitter contest of what ought to be a solemn and shared
understanding." The problem with critical race theorists, in other
words, is that they divide those who have suffered from each other
rather than bringing them together. To avoid this danger, Carter
would enforce a parity among marginalized voices, even if the effect
is to subordinate them all to majoritarian perspectives.
Critical race theory, however, does not value diversity just because of the suffering that may have defined it. We can privilege a
black perspective, if we agree with Carter that one exists, without
creating a divisive hierarchy of suffering. In this view, we should
recognize difference not because of suffering, though that might
make such recognition even more important, but rather because
"love," to use Carter's term, requires us to recognize what is centrally important to others we respect. We should value AfricanAmericans' viewpoints and seek to include them in many of the
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arenas of culture, in other words, because such perspectives distinctively and centrally characterize a community of importance to us.
How can we "love" without granting such respect?
Relational feminism, another diversity perspective Carter discusses, makes this point clear. Unlike Carter's version of critical
race theory, relational feminism does not rest its argument for valuing women's "different voice" on women's oppression. Relational
feminists argue instead that we should represent this different viewpoint in culture simply because it is different and characterizes
many people.s The relationship between representation and oppression is, in fact, just the opposite of what Carter portrays with respect to race. To relational feminists, suffering results from failing
to acknowledge difference. It is not the case that difference necessarily stems from suffering.6
At bottom, then, Carter fails to engage critical race theory's
concept of identity. Recognizing diversity does not have to create
contests of suffering that divide oppressed peoples from each other
but can instead represent "a form of love." Valuing central differences can be the highest form of respect one community can pay
another. This does not, of course, solve all the difficulties. We must
still determine when a community has a different perspective, how
central that perspective is to its identity and whether the community deserves respect. To be sure, these are hard questions. But we
cannot ignore them simply them because they are hard. Otherwise
we put ourselves in the position of having to say that since the
Jaycees and African-Americans both have viewpoints over some
questions that differ from the rest of society's we have to respect
both their perspectives equally-which, in Carter's terms, means
not at all.
Carter's ultimate conclusions suggest that he himself distrusts
some of his arguments. As he admits, "[g]iven the logic of all that I
have said [against affirmative action], I often feel that I should oppose all racial preferences in admission to college and professional
school. But I don't." Instead, he advocates a return to affirmative
action's "roots." To him, "the proper goal of all racial preferences
is opportunity-the chance at advanced training for highly moti5. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development 105, 173-74 (Harv. U. Press, 1982).
6. In fact, the view that women's different voice reflects oppression represents the most
powerful radical feminist critique of relational feminism. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life
and Law 32, 39 (Harv. U. Press, 1987) ("Women value care because men have valued us
according to the care we give them, and we could probably use some. Women think in
relational terms because our existence is defined in relation to men.").
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vated people of color who, for whatever complex set of reasons,
might not otherwise have it." This sounds innocuous enough, but
how can he defend it?
Enhancing opportunity for one group diminishes opportunity
for others. Giving opportunity to those who "might not otherwise
have it" also presupposes the use of a separate standard for people
of color. But, according to Carter's own reasoning, such double
standards lead to invidious racial stereotyping and the "best black"
syndrome. How can we justify either breaching meritocratic standards or placing these kinds of costs on people of color? Carter
never answers and for good reason. On some level he would have to
resort to exactly the types of justifications he has rejected. Carter's
position thus contains a highly charged ambivalence which threatens to undermine his claims.
The root of his ambivalence lies in his notion of black distinctiveness. Although he admits that blacks are different from whites,
he argues against any definite sense of difference. Like much bad
deconstructive theory, blacks seem to be characterized not so much
by particular differences, but by difference itself. Thus, "[racial
s]olidarity ... means not, as the diversity movement would have it,
embracing some special perspective gained from our history of oppression; ... it means rather, embracing our people themselves, in
all their wild and frustrating variety."
But can one ground a group identity largely in group members'
differences from one another? I think not. First, it would be impossible to define the group's outer boundaries. Are other groups, particularly whites, less internally diverse? Second, internal diversity is
at bottom inimical to the very concept of a group identity. The
more different people within a group are from one another and the
more important those differences are to them, the less likely they
are to view themselves as a meaningful group. The more numerous
and important the differences, in other words, the thinner the
shared identity.
Carter wants to have it both ways. On the one hand, he insists
that black group identity is thick enough to be constitutive of his
and other blacks' individual identity. Race, he says at one point,
defines "all that we are." On the other hand, however, he insists
that there can be no "shibboleths" that define one as a black. His
call for "[black] unity, not in the sense of groupthink but in the
sense of group love," suggests that racial solidarity lies primarily in
toleration of difference. African-Americans, in this view, are a people with a shared history but no real shared values. They seem
more a bunch of classical liberals who happen to be black-just an-
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other caucus in the liberal community-than a people with a special
culture.
So deep does Carter's belief in liberalism run, moreover, that
he thinks "identification with an ethnic group" should be "a conscious decision." Even community affiliation should reflect autonomous choice. Thus, in his fantasies, he muses over the possibility of
purely voluntaristic communities: "What I envision is the possibility that each of us might make a choice about which racial group we
prefer to join." He recognizes, of course, that race is not now a
choice, but it "should ideally be [one], a decision one makes to
claim a people, a culture, a history, as one's own."
I must admit that, as a cranky liberal myself, I have some sympathy for this unrealistic position. But I do not think you can have
it both ways. Either the community is special, rich, and constitutive
of individual identity or it is not. The problem may be that Carter
finds himself trying to straddle a divide within the African-American community itself. Carter quite honestly describes himself as
different in many respects from most African-Americans. He is "a
middle-class professional living in the suburbs," one of affirmative
action's success stories. His success, however, places him across a
class divide from most of the people he shares a history with, a
divide which, he believes, now more than race determines the life
opportunities of people of color.
At times Carter acknowledges these limits to his experience
and carefully narrows his arguments to the black middle and professional classes. Thus, in a footnote, for example, he states that
many of his arguments against affirmative action do not extend to
nonprofessionals. At other times, however, Carter speaks as an "intellectual" whose black experience qualifies him to speak to all parts
of the African-American community. He realizes his own difference from most of the people he speaks to but still finds it necessary
to be considered part of the group. This causes him to stretch
group identity very thin, thin enough to cover both the middle and
poorer classes.
His own belief that class, more than race, now defines people's
opportunities should lead him to question this strategy. If he is
right, there are several black communities, not just one, and on
some particular issues some of them may identify more with members of other groups, including some whites, than with other black
communities. Carter suggests, moreover, that the success of affirmative action may itself be partly responsible for this community division. Insofar as his own views of preferences represent a classically
liberal, middle-class outlook, they reflect the success of those civil
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rights programs, including preferences, that enabled him to reach or
stay in the middle-class. Thus, affirmative action may in one sense
be self-limiting. Its very success may be partially responsible for
calls from within some quarters of the black community to limit it.
This is not, however, a simple case either of majoritarian cooption or of some victims pulling up the ladder before others have a
chance to escape. It instead reflects the importance of economic
status to self-definition in our culture. As Carter says: "The day is
gone when large numbers of black students see themselves as the
vanguard of a revolution; what students want now, and with reason,
is a piece of the action. So do 1." Perhaps one effect of the civil
rights movement's success is the development of such class fissures
within the African-American community. Carter's reflections,
then, are ultimately not about affirmative action, but about what it
means to be both black and traditionally successful in a world that
still limits many blacks' chances of success. The book's importance,
in other words, lies not in its arguments, but in its ambivalences.

JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: GREAT DISSENTER OF
THE WARREN COURT. By Tinsley E. Yarbrough.t New
York: Oxford University Press. 1992. Pp. xvi, 395. Cloth,
$29.95.
Michael E. Parrish 2

As Earl Warren and his Court moved aggressively in the late
1950s and early 1960s to eradicate racial segregation and to extend
the Bill of Rights to the states, the first Justice John Marshall
Harlan became a patron saint to Hugo Black, William 0. Douglas
and other of its more liberal, activist members. The former slave
owner from Kentucky, mocked by Justice Holmes as "my lionhearted friend," had dissented in The Civil Rights Cases,3 P/essy v.
Ferguson, 4 Hurtado v. Ca/ifornia,s and Twining v. New Jersey,6 all of
which established his claim to being the jurisprudential progenitor
of those who battled to expunge racism from the Constitution and
to incorporate the Bill of Rights into the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Professor of Political Science, East Carolina University.
Professor of History, University of California, San Diego.
109 u.s. 3 (1883).
163 u.s. 537 (1896).
Ito u.s. 516 (1884).
211 u.s. 78 (1908).

